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The Preference Clause Is Discriminatory
By EDWIN VENNARD*
The preference clause is a public issue of some consequence. It in-
volves a national policy affecting all citizens one way or the other. In some
respects the matter is complicated. Yet, I believe and propose to show that,
as a practical matter, it results in unjust discrimination among our people.
In that respect the issue is rather simple.
There are honest differences of opinion about the preference clause,
and I am impressed with the caliber and the earnestness of those who express
themselves in its favor. Further, I believe that these public expressions
and honest differences of viewpoints will help the American people to de-
cide on that policy which results in the greatest good fori the greatest num-
ber of people.
If I were speaking for any particular group in the country, it would be
for the 80 per cent of American citizens who purchase their power from the
investor-owned electric companies. I would speak for them for the reason
that, in my opinion, they have been treated unjustly in order that the re-
maining 20 per cent of our citizens may stand to benefit from the prefer-
ence clause.
It will be my purpose to explain how this injustice comes about, to
analyze the reasons for the continued existence of the preference clause and
to suggest an appropriate remedy.
I. MY POSITION ON THE BASIC ISSUE
It may be appropriate to open my discussion of the preference clause
with a statement of my position on river development and other matters
broadly concerned with power supply.
River Development
(1) I am in favor of sound river development and effective flood control
and prevention in the public interest-always to the extent that they
are economically feasible and justifiable.
(2) To the extent practical, rivers should be developed by the local citi-
zens directly interested.
(3) To the extent practical, the people who benefit should pay the cost.
(4) River development may or may not require the building of dams.
When dams are built it may be possible to generate economical in-
cidental electric power. This power should be secondary to the
primary purpose. Either electric companies should be licensed to
generate the power, or the power should be sold at or near the dam,
without discrimination, to citizens who want to engage in the power
business. This power should be under government regulation. The
price should cover all of the costs and should also take into account
the value of the power.
Power Capacity
There should be enough electric power for all purposes. Where power
companies are able and willing to develop this power, financed through the
*Vice-President and Managing Director, Edison Electric Institute.
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sale of securities to free investors, the government should not spend tax-
payers' money to build power plants.
Regulation
Because competitive service in a given area by more than one power
supplier is uneconomic, impracticable, and against the public interest, all
power supply should be under governmental regulation, state or national,
depending upon whether the service is intrastate or interstate.
Atomic Energy
It is recognized that the federal government has an important responsi-
bility in atomic research and development. The electric light and power
companies should continue in their atomic energy research and development
program. A "technical appraisal task force" on atomic power reactors,
composed of qualified independent nuclear engineers, scientists and execu-
tives of Edison Electric Institute member companies, should review various
reactor types and designs and recommend the types and designs which have
promise of feasibility for the production of electric power. Where power
companies are willing and able to engage in the research and development
of atomic energy and these reactors, the government should not spend the
taxpayers' money for such development.
II. CONFUSION IN TERMS
The terms "private power" or "private ownership" are frequently at-
tached to the system under which the 80 percent of the American people
get their power from electric companies. The terms "public power" or
"public ownership" are usually applied to the system under which 20 per-
cent of the people get their power from a governmental agency or coopera-
tive. These terms are not accurately descriptive of the two systems and
tend to cloud the issue. Surveys of attitudes and knowledge of the Amer-
ican people indicate that these terms have led to confusion.
Since preference plays a prominent part in the controversy involving
so-called "public power" it seems appropriate to clarify the ownership of
the two systems under which power is developed and sold. In a real sense
the public owns the power business in both systems, although in one it is
quite an involuntary ownership. There are about 400 electric light and
power companies which are owned directly by over 3 million people
through investment in utility company stocks. They are also owned indi-
rectly by almost everyone through insurance companies, investment con-
cerns and the like. There are 93 million insurance policyholders in America.
Four out of five American families have some kind of insurance. Insur-
ance companies own about 60 percent of the electric utility bonds outstand-
ing.
In addition, such important community groups as fraternal, religious
and charitable institutions, foundations, educational institutions and com-
mercial banks owe a large measure of their ability to serve the public to
their investments in the investor-owned electric companies. All these are
the owners, direct and indirect, to whom the profits or net income resulting
from electric company operations go. Thus, electric companies are financed
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Like that of many another industry, the electric industry's history was
marked by the struggles of devoted men to bring before a seemingly unap-
preciative public the advantages to be gained from the widespread adoption
of their service. But it is a tribute to the essential faith of these men in the
American way that they did not give up. They realized that a really worth-
while innovation filling a definite need will always gain an enthusiastic
response eventually, to the benefit of both consumer and producer.
The profit motive, of course, was a major factor in keeping the electric
light and power people constantly at work improving their service, over-
coming technical obstacles and seeking widening public acceptance. With-
out that incentive, would this country have the electric service it enjoys to-
day ?
The profit motive has always been approved by the great majority of
the American people as a proper incentive, and as an integral part of our
system of free economy. A traditionally American way of securing this ap-
proval is to provide more and better service for less money. The investor-
owned electric companies adopted this course of action early in their history,
and over the years have produced in this respect the most remarkable record
of any industry-and this in the face of the long-term inflationary trend.
The high standards of electric service, its continuing technical advance, its
general availability, as well as its low cost, all testify to the foresight and
unremitting planning, research and development, conducted not only by the
electric companies, but by the equipment and appliance manufacturers as
well.
In the case of so-called "public ownership" it is said that all the public
owns the property. This is true only in the sense that the American people
have involuntarily financed the "public power" projects through money
paid the tax collector. There is, however, another important difference in
the style of ownership. In the case of governmental power operation, or
"public ownership," the individual citizen is not free to decide whether or
not he is to be an owner. The real test of ownership of property is where
the owner can sell or otherwise dispose of it. In the case of governmental
"public power" projects the individual citizen cannot sell his alleged share
of the property.
On the other hand, under operation by electric companies the individual
citizen is always free to own a share of the property or not. If he owns a
share, he is free to sell it at the market price.
In view of the ownership situation of the two systems, it thus seems un-
realistic, as well as confusing, to describe one as "private power" and the
other as "public power." Therefore, in this discussion the terms "electric
companies" or "power companies" or "company operation" will be used
when referring to the one system, and "government operation" or "govern-
ment ownership" when referring to the other.
III. GOVERNMENT POWER IS NOT CHEAP POWER
The greatest difference in the methods of operation of the two systems
lies in the different rules applied. The government makes the rules in both
cases. State or federal governmental commissions have control over certain
electric company operations and regulate the price of the product. It is
3
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right that government should. The government requires electric companies
pay takes and this is right. By the nature of the American economy,
electric companies must pay market prices for the money that they use to
build power generating and distributing facilities. As in the sale of all com-
modities, the ultimate consumer of electricity sold by the electric companies
pays, in the cost of the product, the taxes and the cost of money paid in its
production and distribution.
But when government operates the power business, different rules from
those applied to the electric companies are established. Let us take the
very important matter of regulation, for example. The power operations
of federal bureaus and authorities are free from scrutiny or order from
any of the duly constituted state commissions, under whose regulation the
electric companies operate. Nor are they affected by federal regulatory
agencies except in cases where the Federal Power Commission has set up
accounting systems and approved rates. Rules, conditions of services and
rates are formulated by the power producing agencies, and there is no re-
course for the customers other than congressional action.
As in regulation, or rather lack of regulation, other rules for govern-
ment operation are designed to favor this method. These differences are so
great and have such an important bearing on the preference clause that
discussion would be useful. But since time will not permit examination of
all of the discriminatory differences of the rules, we will presently limit
ourselves to two important differences, namely, the cost of money and
taxes.
A. Cost of Money
Power Company
The power business requires a large amount of money for plant con-
struction-about eight times that required by an ordinary manufacturer for
the same volume of business. Therefore, the cost of money is an important
item in the cost of furnishing electric service. Electric companies borrow
this money from the investing public. The companies must pay the market
price, otherwise people invest their money elsewhere. That is what we call
the "free market." This is the method used that is sometimes called the
"American system."
Government Power
The government makes the rules on the financing of government power
projects or other so-called public bodies. Government power projects do
not pay the market price of money. For example, TVA pays no interest
on the almost $2 billion of taxpayers' money donated to it by the Congress.
Nevertheless, interest has been and is being paid. It is paid by every tax-
ipayer when he digs out of his pocket every year his contribution to the
item marked "interest on the public debt" in the Federal Budget.
In some instances government power projects pay interest, but as point-
ed out by Representative Frank T. Bow, of Ohio, this interest rate is con-
siderably below the cost of money to the government.' Representative Bow
also points out that the Administration is not applying the proper interest
rate for the cost of money in keeping with terms of the Flood Control Act
of 1944.
'Address before the Edison Electric Institute convention, June 5, 1956.
[Vol. 18,
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But the cost of borrowed money to the government does not represent
the price that American citizens want for the use of their money when it is
used in the power business. The government's general taxing power is a
factor that influences the price the banks charge the government for loans.
The way to find out what the American people want for the use of their
money in the power business is to examine the daily published quotations
on purchases and sales of securities of companies in the power business.
If it is argued that the government should be in the power business for
the reason that its taxing powers enable the government to borrow money
at less than the free marke price, then the same argument applies to other
businesses. Obviously the end result is a system wholly foreign to that of
the American concept.
B. Taxes
In the matter of taxes the government also establishes different rules
under the two systems. Power companies are taxed by local governing
bodies and are required to pay the regular federal income tax. On the other
hand, government power projects pay lower, if any, local taxes and are re-
quired to pay no federal income tax.
A traditional American trait is fairness. It is one of the characteristics
that has made us a great people. Is it not unfair for the men in government
who make the rules to require the electric companies to pay federal income
taxes and then to set up governmental power businesses and charge them
no federal income tax ?
It is sometimes argued that there is no logical reason why the govern-
ment in the power business should pay taxes to itself. Is this not a play on
terms? Taxes, like al other expenses, go to make up the cost of furnishing
electric service, whether by the electric companies or by governmental
agencies. As a result of this unfairness, customers of the electric companies
pay federal taxes in their electric bills, whereas customers of the government
projects do not.
Now let us examine the results of this discrimination, and its practical
effect when coupled with the preference clause. Few people realize the ef-
fect of these two subsidies, cost of money and taxes, in government power
operations. The notion that government power, or so-called public power,
is cheap is a myth. It is simply power that is sold below cost. There is
nothing about government which makes men who work there more efficient
than men who work in business.
Let us take TVA as an example. If TVA were required to pay the
market price of money as the companies must pay, and the same taxes the
power companies are required to pay, TVA would have to almost double its
rates to break even. In other words, TVA rates are only a little more than
half what they should be. As a result of these two subsidies, customers of
government bodies such as TVA get their electricity at less than its cost to
the government-at the expense of all taxpayers.
Advertisements in nationally circulated publications boast that TVA
has available "low-cost" electricity for industry, in order to lure to Ten-
nessee those industries that might otherwise locate in some other state, al-
though the people and the industries of the other states make up the dif-
ference between this subsidized power and true-cost power through their
taxes which support TVA.
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General Vogel, Chairman of the Board of the Tennessee Valley, has
said: "A number of factors, aside from those of taxes, interest and profit,
are favorable to low power costs in the Tennessee Valley region, and it is
upon those that I shall attempt to focus attention. Nevertheless, I cannot
ignore the very real advantages accruing to any system which operates for
minimum earning rather than a normal profit and which is not required by
law to pay interest on its obligations or income taxes to the federal govern-
ment. In all fairness, it must be admitted that these result in consumer
advantages not enjoyed by the customers of private power companies. Any
talk about establishing a measure for the cost of power without reference
to these factors is, of course, absurd."'
Nevertheless, one of the reasons advanced for establishing TVA in the
first place was the purpose of establishing a "yardstick" to measure the
proper level for the rates of the electric companies, as a means of keeping
the power company rates in line. Is that fair when government power en-
joys so great a subsidy ? For about 20 years the American people have been
told of the TVA yardstick. Those of us in the power business have known
all along that it was an unfair yardstick and now we have the frank state-
ment of the present Chairman of the Board of the TVA who recently said,
"I don't know how we would ever solve the problem of paying federal in-
come tax, for instance; and insofar as we fall short on that, this is not a
yardstick. And I don't kid myself, and I think no one should kid himself,
that a yardstick is involved in this. It is a measuring stick, yes."
It seems likely that the inequity, and the special privileges of govern-
ment power have never been summed up more concisely than by the late
Senator Norris, author of the TVA act. When TVA first moved in, and
the taxpaying electric companies were forced out, a number of local and
state governments found their tax receipts seriously cut. The suggestion
was made that TVA should be taxed in the same way that any other power
company is, moving Senator Norris to declare in a burst of candor that, if
subjected to equal taxation, "TVA would be out of business in three
months."
Admiral Ben Moreell, former Chairman of the Second Hoover Com-
mission Task Force on Water Resources and Power, in the course of a series
of lectures at the University of Chicago this Spring observed that "the con-
struction of federal power projects as 'yardsticks' to control the rates
charged by investor-owned utilities is clearly a deception. By virtue of
the various subsidies, particularly the failure to include taxes.., the 'yard-
stick' proposed by public power has the equivalent of something in the
neighborhood of 24 to 27 inches."
Thus, it appears that there is a mistaken notion about this "cheapness"
of government power, or "public power." It is subsidized power. It is
power which is sold below cost to a favored few.
IV. PREFERENCE MEANS SPECIAL PRIVILEGE
I should like to lead into the next phase of our discussion, the ultimate
effect of the preference clause, with a further quotation from Admiral
Moreell. "The preference policy," he said in the course of the University
'Address before the American Power Conference, March 22, 1956.
[Vol. 18,
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of Chicago lectures, "in effect, makes any customer of a non-publicly owned
utility a second-class citizen so far as federal power is concerned. The com-
pany from which he buys power is denied federal power. His neighbor
across the road or in the next town, served by a cooperative or a municipal-
ity, gets power for less than true cost while he, in his electric rate, pays local,
state, and federal taxes in a greater amount because his neighbor pays
nothing toward these ends. Investor-financed power companies," he con-
tinued, "by their tax payments, are forced to subsidize competing public
power. Approximately 80 percent of our people obtain their power from
the investor-financed companies and they, in large measure, subsidize the
20 percent who are served by public power."
These discussions, I think, have shown that the most inequitable advan-
tages and weapons enjoyed by federal power projects in competing with the
power companies are (1) their complete freedom from federal taxation,
(2) the exercise of the preference clause of the Flood Control Act of 1944
and other public power acts in the sale of electricity to a favored group of
customers.
Both advantages are flagrantly discriminatory; both are closely related
in their operation. The first is mandatory since it is within the provisions
of the law as it stands today, and the second has been so interpreted and
exercised by the federal power producing agencies. In effect they are re-
sponsible, along with elastic interpretations of the law and unrealistic cost
allocations and rate setting, for the subsidization of approximately one-fifth
of electricity consumers today, at the expense of the other four-fifths.
To give the tax-free status its full weight, federal electricity sales are
made preferentially to municipally owned power distribution systems, co-
operatives and public power districts, which in turn enjoy federal tax ex-
emption and local exemption in large degree.
A brief look at the origin of the preference clause seems pertinent at
this point. According to H. N. Beamer, of the Idaho Public Service Com-
mission:
It is frequently said that the federal power preference statutes had
their origin in an early reclamation act of April 16, 1906, and are there-
fore an established and unchangeable principle in the federal govern-
ment's resource development program. Such a statement is absolutely
false. The preference clauses, as they exist today, had their origin in
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, and were one of the sev-
eral vehicles without which the socialization of the electric industry in
the TVA area could not have been accomplished.
The Act of 1906 merely provided that whenever a development of
power was necessary for the irrigation of lands, the Secretary of the
Interior was authorized to lease any surplus power or power, privileges
"giving preference to municipal purposes." The same wording, "giv-
ing preference to municipal purposes," was used in subsequent acts in
1911, and even as late as 1922.'
3
"Municipal purposes" means for such purposes as street lighting and water pumping.
There was no discrimination among towns or citizens. There was no discrimination
in favor of government power or "public power." There was no discrimination in
favor of citizens who get their power from "public power" projects and cooperatives.
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It is very plain that such a preference was based upon the use of
power and is in favor of the power user. It was, in fact, limited to
municipalities as consumers of electric power for municipal purposes
as distinguished from the proprietory business of selling power to
the public for general use. It was not a preference based upon the
type of agency which distributes power to the actual consumer.
The master plan of the federal power program was set forth in the Ten-
nessee Valley Act of 1933 and in subsequent acts culminating in the Flood
Control Act of 1944. In these measures preference in the purchase of fed-
erally produced power was extended to all types of public bodies and co-
operatives, and government power advocates have arranged for interpreta-
tions to suit their purposes. Below-cost pricing is obviously designed to
encourage the establishment of local public power systems to qualify as
preference customers under the law.
In practice the law has also been used to discriminate against electric
companies, even where a company could retail the electricity at a lower fig-
ure than could the local, privileged, tax-free systems. This, of course, en-
courages the continuance of inefficient systems, to the detriment of electric
service and the purses of both the local consumer and the taxpayer at large.
Again the men in government set the rules. They rule that "public bodies,"
that is, government power projects, power districts, municipal plants and
cooperatives, shall be given preference in the purchase of power generated
by the federal government. Thereby they have set up a specially privileged
class in America and have said in effect that this privileged class shall have
first call on government subsidized power and that other people, the cus-
tomers of the investor-owned electric companies, shall in effect be classified
as second-class citizens.
Is not America a place where special privileges are frowned upon? Is
not government the body to which people look to prevent unjust discrimina-
tions? This is discrimination and special privilege of the worst sort. To
make matters worse, the special privilege spreads like a disease and the
preference clause encourages this spreading. So-called "public bodies"
want it because of its subsidies. More "public bodies" can get it because
they have preference. Carry this process to its logical conclusion and no-
body benefits at the expense of anybody else, but you will have one of our
great business institutions being run by men in government who also will
act as their own regulators.
V. PUBLIC OPINION
Why does this preference policy-which is so unfair and unjust to 80
percent of our people--continue in effect? Possibly we may find the
answer suggested in the surveys of public opinion and in other measures
of the public's knowledge of these matters.
I am privileged to quote from -the results of opinion surveys conducted
over the past few years by Central Surveys, Inc. This information will be
of interest to both sides of this debate.
Interviews or questionnaires completed covered a broad section of elec-
tricity users. They included:
2667 members of rural electric cooperatives in four states,
[Vol. 18,
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2250 rural retail customers of electric utility companies, also in four
states, and
997 urban retail customers of electric utility companies in three
states.
In the rural co-op groups, knowledge of preference status enjoyed was
held by only 5% of the co-op members interviewed. Among company cus-
tomers, only 4% had any knowledge of preference. This in itself is a clue
to our trouble. But, more significantly, when informed of the preference,
both the customers of companies and the co-op members expressed them-
selves about 7 to 1 against preference. Here are the results:
Co-op Company
Members Customers
Know of Preference ----------......------------................. 5% 4%
Opinions:
Support of Preference .................................
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In the aggregate of surveys, when asked why they opposed preference,
66 percent said everybody should have "equal treatment." Eighteen per-
cent mentioned general free enterprise attitudes and 5 percent referred to
taxes.
In a South Dakota newspaper poll, we get a clue as to the opinion of
customers of a municipally-owned power system. Again we find the vote
nearly 7 to 1 against preference. The following table shows these results:
Customers of Municipally-
Owned Plant
Support of Preference ---------------------------------------- 12%
Oppose Preference ---------------------------------------------- 82%
No Opinion ----------------------------------------------------------- 6%
PUBLIC OPINION
RESIDENTS OF M 0 TOWNS
82%I
12%/
APPROVE PREFERENCE DISAPPROVE PREFERENCE NO OPINION
These measures of public attitude seem to indicate that we can attribute
continuance of this preference and discrimination to the fact that only rela-
tively few people are informed on the subject. That is why a public debate
of this kind is so valuable. That is why such public discussion is in the pub-
lic interest. Here we have a situation where most people do not know the
facts. When informed as to the facts they express themselves as being op-
posed to preference. This happened in the opinion sampling. It seems
logical that the same would happen if Americans generally were informed
as to the facts. This suggests that the solution of our problem is in telling
people the facts about preference. When properly informed, the American
people can be counted upon to demand fair treatment.
VI. VALIDITY OF ARGUMENTS FOR SUBSIDIZED POWER
It may be pertinent to examine here a few of the principal arguments
that are often advanced by proponents of the preference clause and gov-
ernment power.
A. It is sometimes stated that the low rates of such government power
projects as TVA helped to keep down the electric rates of power companies
hroughout the country.
10
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I have been in close touch with the rate end of the business throughout
my business career, beginning in 1928. If space permitted I could demon-
strate at length that the above statement is not true. Some evidence of this
fact can be found from the accompanying chart which shows the index of
the average price of residential electricity of all electric power companies
in the country over a period of many years. The trend has been steadily
downward. This is of particular significance in view of the trend of the
over-all cost of living, shown in the upper curve of the chart. On an index
base of 100 in 1913, the cost of living index had risen to 270 at the end of
1955 and the average price of residential electricity dropped to the index
figure of 30. Note also that the greatest percentage drop occurred before
the year 1933, which marked the beginning of the TVA.
COST OF LIVING
VS
AVERAGE PRICE OF ELECTRICITY2so 280
2601 260
240- 240
22JCOST OF LIVING C20
200 (L S BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 200
2O E E ITE180
X1601 160 X
S140 --- 140
12 3I 53 120
dicteOha t oo
so 80
40 -4 . _ 0
|- AVERAGE PRICE OF RESIDENTIAL ELECRCT
20 (EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE) - 0t :
1913 '15 '17 '19 '21"23 '251.271'9'31 '33 '35 '37 '39 '41 '43 '45 47 '49 '51,'53 1955
Instead of causing lower rates generally, there is some evidence to in-
dicate that the subsidized government power rates may actually be causing
higher rates in neighboring territory than would otherwise be the case. We
have seen that the cost of money is a substantial item in the cost of furnish-
ing electric service. The cost of money depends upon the market price of
money. When subsidized government power enters a territory, investors in
adjoining property may become uneasy lest their investment be destroyed.
The risk of investment becomes greater and this tends to increase the cost
of money, all of which is reflected in the price of service.
But aside from that point, let us again consider the fairness of such an
approach to rate regulation. Let us take a homely case of a grocery store
owned and operated by a businessman in the usual American fashion. He
has invested his money and possibly that of his friends and associates. He
pays taxes including federal income taxes. Assume then that the govern-
ment decides to build a grocery store beside him in order to set up a yard-
stick to measure the fairness of his prices or as a means of keeping his prices
in line. The food supplies are given to the operator of this government
store, after purchase from general tax funds. The operator of the govern-
11
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ment store is required to pay no federal income taxes. Obviously he can sell
groceries at a lower price. Is that a fair way to keep the businessman in
line? The inevitable result would be that the businessman would sell out
or be forced out of business. That is what has happened in the power busi-
ness in Tennessee. There are practically no power companies left in that
state. We, the whole nation, have lost the taxes those companies would be
paying, if they were now in existence. The taxes that all people pay are
now higher than they would be if those companies were in existence and pay-
ing their share. A similar result seems certain wherever subsidized power
takes root.
B. It is argued that government subsidized power greatly helps the
economic development of a region.
The facts dispute this. Again let's take TVA as an example. The State
of Tennessee, principal domain of the authority, has not advanced eco-
nomically ahead of its neighbors despite the spending by the TVA of about
two billion dollars of taxpayers' money :' Among its ten neighbors in the
South population-wise Tennessee was 4th in 1930 and 5th in 1955. In con-
struction contracts its position each year has depended upon the rate of
government construction. In postal receipts its 1933 standing was 3rd
among the eleven states and in 1954 it had slid off to 4th place. In total
personal income it was in 4th place in 1933. It has dropped to 5th place and
remained there for the years 1943 through 1955. In new business incor-
porations it stood 5th in 1946 but dropped to 6th place in 1955. In total
deposits of all banks it stood 2nd in 1933 and 3rd in 1954. It did advance
its economic standing in percent of U. S. total individual income taxes paid;
it stood 6th in 1933 and 5th in 1954.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TENNESSEE ?
2nd




1930 1955 1933 1954 1933 1955 1946 1955 1933 1954 1933 1954
POPULATION POSTAL PERSONAL BUSINESS TOTAL INDIVIDUAL
RECEIPTS iNCOME INCORPOR" DEPOSITS INCOME TAX
ATIONS PAiD
At the House hearings on the Public Works Appropriations Bill for
1956, R~epresentative Phillips, of California, observed to General Vogel,
'Data from U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census and Survey of Current Busi-
ness ; Statistical Abstract of the U.S. ; Dun's Statistical Review.
[Vol. 18,
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Chairman of the TVA Board, that--'the United States Chamber of Com-
merce compared Tennessee with these other 10 Southeastern States as of
1930 and then in 1950, and found that Tennessee had made no advance dur-
fing that time in the various criteria which are used in commerce as the
testing criteria for improvement, progress, or failure. The states around
Tennessee which have been compelled to depend upon private power have
done better than Tennessee, which has depended entirely upon TVA pow-
er." Continuing, he asked, "Did you want to say anything about that?"
The TVA chairman replied, in part, "I have been very much con-
cerned myself by the undue emphasis placed upon that particular thing,
and the slanting which I think it has received at the hands of those who
purport to be the champions of TVA .... I do not wish to belittle the accom-
plishments by the TVA, nor the great gains which have been made in the
valley, but I am concerned about the overemphasis and the slanting, because
I am afraid that people have come to get somewhat of an erroneous impres-
sion and, in fact, I do not like that argument at all."
But even if this argument were true, what of the fairness to other re-
gions? Is it fair to tax the people and the industries of all states so that
people and the industries of one state can obtain subsidized power ?
C. It is argued that state regulation is inadequate and competition
from the federal government is necessary to keep prices in line.
In my career in rate work I have had occasion to deal with many of our
state regulatory bodies. I have found them by and large honest, conscien-
tious and effective. It is a disservice to our state government institutions
to say that federal competition is necessary because of the failure of men in
local government to perform their duty. If we have a breakdown in state
regulation in an area, the people of that area are fully able to bring about
the required remedy.
D. It is sometimes argued that certain areas of our country need
economic aid and that the federal government should supply it from gov-
ernment subsidized power.
This is a rather broad question. It is subject to much debate in itself.
If any areas of the country are destitute and need financial aid, let us con-
sider taking care of that in the open. Let us not camouflage the help to an
area through such means as subsidized electric power. It is doubtful that
the people of Tennessee are unable to stand on their own feet. If the people
of Tennessee knew the facts it is doubtful that they would want to continue
to receive such benefits as they are now receiving from subsidized power
at the expense of their neighbors in other states.
E. Finally, it is argued that the electric companies should not have a
monopoly in the power business, that the government should at least be al-
lowed to be in some of the power business.
Again, could not the same argument be made for every other kind of
business? Should the steel people have a monopoly in the production of
steel or should the government also be in that business? By the same argu-
ment, should not the government be partially in the business of producing
oil and coal and the manufacture of our various products? The answer
seems to be that the government should not be in business because it is not
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set up to be in business. The American government is set up to be the regu-
lator and the umpire, not the player. Government's primary duty is to
maintain order and fair play.
VII. BROAD IMPLICATIONS
I have tried to approach the problem from the standpoint of the
analysis of facts which indicates that the present practice is unfair, unjust
and discriminatory. However, a discussion of this kind is not complete
without reference to the broad implications involved in the kind of thinking
that enters into the preference clause. It happens to have particular im-
plications with respect to the power business. If allowed to continue, it can
lead to complete government operation of the power business. If the prefer-
ence principle is proper in the power business, by the same logic it is proper
in other businesses. If applied there it will lead to government operation of
those businesses.
Obviously the logical end result of the application of this principle will
be some kind of social system which is foreign to that intended by the found-
ers of our Constitution. Sometimes this end result is called socialism. At
least we find that most definitions refer to a socialistic state as one in which
the government operates the principal means of production. We do know
that the socialist party in America has advocated government operation of
the power business and all the basic industries from the very beginning. We
know the socialist parties in England and in other countries stand for gov-
ernment operation of key industries, including power. We know that Lenin
believed that socialization of power was one of the first steps in the creation
of a socialistic state.
From this it should not be inferred that all of the people in America
who believe in government operation of the power business are necessarily
socialists. It does not mean that my worthy opponents in this debate are
socialists. Nevertheless, we are living in an age when we need to analyze
these problems carefully. On all sides men discuss our present troubled
times. We are prosperous, and yet serious men are gravely concerned lest
we in our generation somehow fail to leave future generations the great gifts
and opportunities we have enjoyed. These have been possible because we
have been free-individually free-free from the government domination
which has plagued mankind throughout all history-free from the govern-
ment domination which today plagues most men on earth. We can trace our
spiritual, moral and material well-being to this freedom. We have material
strength because of it. In our generation we have fought two world wars
in defense of this freedom. Even today we find the world divided into two
camps, each engaged in a race of preparation of fearful arms against what
might come. We are ready again to use these arms in defense of our free-
dom if necessary, although we pray every day it may not be.
You asked what has this to do with preference. It has much. Thought-
ful men believe, and I concur, that there is more danger of our losing our
freedom by reason of something happening within us than by sabotage by
outside forces. History teaches us that most peoples have lost what freedom
they had by reason of these inside forces. I also believe that if we lose free-
dom as a result of something happening within us it will not be through the
adoption of socialism or communism, in name. We must not confuse our-
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selves with terminology. Government control and operation of the means
of production has been called by many names throughout all history and
in all cases it has been accompanied by absence of individual freedom.
Basically speaking there are only two kinds of society:
(1) There is the philosophy that the individual should rely upon gov-
ernment for his personal economic security and advancement. The
government is responsible for his welfare and livelihood. The
government controls the economy. The government uses force,
which is the only means available to a government, to operate such
a system. We have called this system by many names. We have
called the head man a Pharaoh, a Caesar, a Czar, a King, a Fuehr-
er, a Tyrant, a Dictator. Man is not free.
(2) The other philosophy requires that the individual rely upon him-
self for his personal economic security. He sets up a government
to maintain order and fair play. He takes the risk. He is free.
Our danger in America lies in Americans who through lack of knowl-
edge or otherwise call upon their government to do for them those things
which men can and should do for themselves. The danger lies in men in
government who try to do for the people those things which the people can
and should do for themselves.
These dangers were foreseen by Thomas Jefferson when he said:
A wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from
injuring one another, which shall leave them otherwise free to regu-
late their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not
take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned-this is the
sum of good government....
If we can prevent the government from wasting the labors of
the people, under the pretense of taking care of them, they must be-
come happy.
The preservation of our freedom in America lies in the hands of our
citizens. If we call upon our government to take care of us the government
will do it, but let us think well before we make such demands. As in the case
Of the followers of Abraham, who flocked into Egypt, the end result is
slavery and bondage. It may be some time before we have another Moses
to lead us out.
Preference thinking is the kind of thinking that results in the perform-
ance by government of those tasks which the American people should per-
form for themselves. Preference leads to government operation of an im-
portant segment of our productive economy when that segment can well be
handled by free men taking care of themselves without calling upon their
government for help.
VIII. SUGGESTED REMEDY
Let us briefly review the basic facts that I have tried to present:
1. The preference clause is unfair and unjust in that it benefits about
20 percent of our people at the expense of 80 percent.
2. The preference clause results in a waste of taxpayers' money in
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that it leads to government construction of power facilities that can and
should be built by the citizens.
3. The preference clause breeds on itself and leads to more and more
government operation of the power business, which ultimately can lead to
complete government operation.
4. The preference clause is un-American. This kind of thinking and
practice could lead to the kind of social system where individual freedom
could not exist.
5. At the beginning of my discussion I said the preference clause issue
was simple in that it resulted in unjust discrimination among our citizens.
The opinion surveys show conclusively that when the American people know
the facts they are overwhelmingly opposed to it.
This, I think, brings us to the point where we can ask the question,
"What is the remedy for the unjust and harmful discriminations of the
preference clause'?" The remedy, it seems to me, has two components. The
first lies in that great corrective of injustices and abuses-an informed pub-
lic opinion. It depends upon the knowledge and then the wisdom, the good
sense, and the sense of fairness and justice of the general public and of
Congress. The second component of the remedy, briefly, lies in the amend-
ment of the existing unfair legislation concerning the sale of power from
federal generation plants. Such amendments would require that govern-
mentally produced power (1) be sold at point of generation, (2) be sold at
its fair market value, and (3) be allocated in proportion to the number of
rural, residential and retail commercial customers served by the respective
applicants for the power.
Everyone, I think, will agree that only the American people, informed
and purposeful, can exert the influence necessary to correct legislation that
is harming their best interest. The traditional love of individual freedom
of Americans, the inherent sense of justice and equity of the great majority
offers assurance that once the issues are known there can be no fear of the
outcome.
How can the issues become known to the public? That, frankly, is a
problem of great magnitude that needs the work of willing hearts and hands
of those who are interested in fair play and the preservation of our Amer-
ican traditions. The preference clause and tax exemption carry within
themselves the seeds of decay, the virus of privilege, and unfairness and
loss of revenue to government that foredoom them to ultimate extinction.
Nevertheless, it seems a clear duty to hasten in every fair and honest way
the end of these cancerous growths that devitalize and endanger a healthy
economy. This will require the use of many avenues of communication-
word of mouth, the printed word, and honest public debates. Such public
discussion is in the public interest because, I believe, a well-informed public
will reach the right solution.
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